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How Law Thinks of Disobedience: Perceiving 
and Addressing Desertion and Conscientious 
Objection in Israeli Military Courts 
HADAR A VIRAM 
The studv transcends the dichotomy "law ill the hooks"j"law in action" by 
taking lu;I"s knowledge-production mechanisms seriously. It examines how the 
Israeli militarl' justice system perceives and addresses disobedience tOlt'{/rd the 
mandaton' militory service dUi.1' hy deserters alld conscientiolls objectors. Both 
groups resist the lIIilitary service ethos but differ in the ojfenders' demographics 
and !notivations. The findings show how law co-opts the socio-political prohlems, 
assimilates them, and transforms them to narrolV its framework. The legal 
system call be cognitiveiy open to external frameworks introduced bl' powerful 
and resourceful defendants: it remains, however, Ilormative!y closed to alternative 
rules and perspectives. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One bright and unremarkable morning in :2000, the Israeli military court 
addressed the case of a soldier who committed an unauthorized absence 
from service to help his family through an economic crisis. He was one of 
more than a thousand people in similar situations tried that year for desertion 
and probably one of ten to twenty defendants for the same offense that 
very morning. The audience seats were almost empty and the case yielded 
practically no public interest. The "guilty" verdict led to a substantial 
prison sentence, As part of a short, formulaic verdict, the court wrote: 
------- --- --.-.----
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The defendant's behavior is very severe and combines severe elements of taking 
the law into one's own hands and a severe violation of military discipline. The 
defendant's disciplinary past also cannot be ignored. nor our impression that 
he did not make the most of the array of legal paths available to him before 
he took the law into his own hands. (South 64/00: I) 
Cases like this were tried, on a regular basis. in the years that followed. 
including in the summer of 2003. when in the adjacent hall. a well-attended. 
sensational trial took place. Five conscientious objectors were tried for 
refusing to serve in the army due to the occupation of the territories. The 
room was packed with family members and political supporters. who were 
occasionally interviewed before the media cameras outside the court. The 
defendants were eventually convicted, and. like the typical deserter. were 
sentenced to a considerable prison sentence. In their lengthy verdict. the 
court wrote: 
This is ideological or political crime. and it is more severe and dangerous than 
regular criminal activity stemming from a wish for personal benefit ... not 
only do they disobey the law. they renounce its compulsory power. They might 
be imitated by others. enjoy the support of people and public institutions. 
which hinders an egalitarian enforcement of law. and might gather around 
them a large public, who might be prepared to exhibit violence behavior to the 
point of mutiny and rebellion against the authorized go\"ernment. that is. 
democratic society. (Headquarters 151. 174. 205. 222. 243/03: 3) 
What do we make of the similarities between the two types of cases? What 
do we make of the differences between them? Did the court simply apply an 
abstract principle-the duty to perform military sen'ice-to the soldiers' 
cases? Does the verdict. therefore. reflect its formal adherence to the principle 
of general deterrence and the rule of law? Or. was the verdict shaped by the 
court's knowledge about the political and socio-economic situation in 
Israel, or by its bureaucratic need to smoothly handle the morning's caseload 
without creating dangerous precedents? Does the fact that the process-the 
public attendance. the media. the procedural path of the trial-was so different 
matter, in light of the similar results? 
What we see in the juxtaposition of these two examples cannot be fully 
captured and explained using any of the two traditional paradigms through 
which mainstream scholarship has viewed law: "law in the books" and "la\\ 
in action" (Pound 1910). The two paradigms have been presented as 
diametrically opposed to each other. and their contrast has become the 
formative idea of law and society studies. the ""great di\ide" (Sarat and 
Kearns 1993). "Law in the books." that is. the doctrinal. lawyerly view on 
law, would argue that in both cases the court has applied a generaL univer-
sal principle-the rule of law-to the specifics of the case (convicting those 
who knowingly eschew their legal duty to perform military service). By 
doing so. the court weighs the different interests (upholding the law versus 
considering the defendants' personal circumstances) and makes a legal 
decision (Mensch 1998: Vandevelde 1996). This endogenous. doctrinal 
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analysis of what law, or the court, has done in these cases, provides a 
decent explanation for the similar outcomes in both cases, which support 
the rule of law; however, it entirely misses the differences in context, the 
way the trials progressed, and their meaning in the extra-legal world. 
"Law in Action," a social science paradigm aimed at contrasting the 
normative decrees of substantial and procedural law with the practices in 
the field (see Banakar 2003; Cotterell 1995; Dau-Schmidt 1999; Friedman 
1986; Levine 1990; Sarat and Kearns 1993; Trubek 1990), would seek to 
provide an entirely different narrative to explain the two types of verdicts. 
The decision to severely punish a deserter-examined in light of empirical 
data pointing to a strong correlation between desertion and socio-economic 
deprivation-could be interpreted as the product of class and wealth differences 
in society, perpetuated and supported by the legal structure (see, e.g., Balbus 
1973; Hay, Linebaugh, Rule, Thompson and Winslow 1975; Stone 1985). It 
could also be explained as a product of the court's organizational structure, 
in which guilty pleas, established punishment levels, and easy solutions 
smooth the everyday interaction between the actors in the system (e.g., 
Blumberg 1967; Emmelman 1996; Feeley, 1973; Nardulli 1978; Sudnow 
1965). On the other hand, the conviction and severe punishment of a 
conscientious objector could be interpreted as the outcome of a politically 
driven move to legitimize the military occupation of the territories through 
the mechanisms of due process. These explanations capture some of the 
realities behind the cases; however, they do not take law. and the rule of 
law, seriously. They see the similar legal reasoning in both cases as a ruse, a 
mechanism for legitimacy in the face of inequality and extralegal considerations 
rather than taking legal reasoning itself to task and examining its meaning. 
By ignoring the way in which the law thinks, traditional "law in action" 
scholarship misses a rich dimension of what law, and the legal system, does. 
This article is an empirical building block in a more recent tradition of 
scholarship, which offers a way in which the "law in action" path can be 
enriched to include a perspective that takes law, its products, and its 
operations, seriously. The analysis it suggests does not comment on law's 
normative objectives, in the manner of "law in the books" scholarship. Rather, 
it reveals how law itself, through its ways of perceiving problems, constructing 
content, and crafting logic. accounts for practices in the legal arena. Using 
the examples of desertion and conscientious objection, I examine how the 
military justice system uses and produces knowledge about disobedience; 
how this knowledge helps it conceptualize disobedience as a criminal offense; 
how it structures images of the offenders; and how its adherence to doctrinal 
principles clashes with its sensitivity to extralegal factors like political 
conflict and social inequalities when it addresses disobedience through the 
mechanisms of the criminal justice process. 
Several important works in the last few decades have made suggestions 
for bridging, or transcending, the law in the books/law in action dichotomy. 
Some scholars do so by examining the meaning of law on everyday lives 
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(Ewick and Silbey 2000; Sarat 1990; Sarat and Keams 1993); others have 
examined its symbolic value for social movements (McCann 1986, 1998). In the 
context of this project, however, I use a different approach, which relies on 
the scholarship of Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann 2004; Luhmann and Baecker 
1995) and Gunther Teubner (1983, 1989,2001). Luhmann and Teubner see 
law as a social system, which operates on the basis of endemic dichotomies 
(mainly the dichotomy "legal/illegal") and concepts (Clam 2001). To them, 
law is an autopoietic system; it does not engage in dialogue with other 
disciplines or forms of knowledge. When law is "irritated" by concepts 
from other disciplines, it co-opts and transforms them to become part of its 
own knowledge-production mechanisms (Luhmann 2004) These autopoietic 
characteristics make law "cognitively open" to external irritants, but "norm-
atively closed," in the sense that, eventually, these irritants are incorporated 
into the internal web of communications and dialogues (King and Piper 
1990; Nobles and Schiff 2001). 
The article does not aim to provide a detailed analysis of these theoretical 
frameworks, nor to synthesize them with the work of other theorists who 
have examined the legal field from epistemological, text-conscious perspectives, 
such as Bordieu's notion of a legal "field" (1987), Fish's analysis of the law's 
"formal existence" (1991), or the work of some scholars in the Foucaultian 
tradition of governmentality, whose analysis of policymaking texts relies on 
an ""empiricism of the surface" (Hunt and Wickham 1994; Rose 1999; 
Simon 1998, 2007).' Rather, it utilizes Luhmann's perception of law insight 
premise according to which law consists, at least in part, of a mechanism 
for adapting and producing knowledge. This notion does not require full 
acceptance of the Luhmannian premise according to which law is entirely 
disconnected from extralegal concepts; nor does systems theory, as presented 
by Luhmann and Teubner, account for such an alienated definition of law 
(King 1995,2001). As Mariana Valverde points out, 
[o]ne can reject the depiction of law as an autonomous epistemic subject 
generated in the texts of autopoiesis writers and nevertheless acknowledge 
Luhmann and Teubner's insights into the ways that law creatively appropriates 
extralegal knowledges. Inquiring into law's knowledges, law's research methods, 
would not have been possible within the limits of the critique of ideology 
framework that has been so ubiquitous within progressive legal studies and 
sociology of law. That framework demonstrated its power in enabling a whole 
generation of critical legal studies, feminist legal analysis, queer legal scholarship, 
and critical race theory. But like all frameworks, it has its limits, and these have 
become more visible in recent years. The inability of this framework to see 
what Luhmann and Teubner see-law's active role in constituting powers and 
knowledges-has already been mentioned. This blind spot can be regarded as 
the effect of a more general problem, namely, the myth of the socioeconomic 
"real." (Valverde 2003: 5) 
As Valverde suggests, the weakness of critical theories is in their adherence 
to the "real" as a critique of legal regimes. While the enterprise of uncovering 
power dynamics is worthy and important, it falls short of demonstrating 
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the legal system's power in creating realities and the machinations by which 
the system creates them. This project, therefore, is an addition to the works 
that draw attention to the patterns by which the "real" is constructed by 
legal knowledge (King and Piper 1990; Wandall 2007). By putting the 
Luhmannian understanding of law to an empirical test, I seek to show how 
legal knowledge about disobedience interacts with legal policymaking. The 
article uses data gathered from the legal system's communications and 
products-courtroom hearings and verdicts-to uncover the inner logic and 
thought patterns that lie at the base of the policies regarding deserters 
and conscientious objectors. As I show here, the legal classification logic 
dominates the perceptions and policies toward disobedient soldiers by 
reducing, simplifying, and classifying their personalities, demographics, and 
motivations. Admittedly, intellectual, middle-class defendants with a well-
articulated political agenda, like the conscientious objectors, succeed more 
than weak and powerless defendants, like deserters, in presenting the extralegal 
context to their disobedience. However, the internal legal system uses 
similar thought patterns to make sense of both groups and eventually reduces 
their differences and circumstances using established, monolithic categories. 
Therefore, while the importance of power differences and professional 
conflicts to the shaping of legal policies cannot be discounted, this article 
argues that such external factors are eventually co-opted and modified in 
their discursive interaction with formal law. The findings suggest that the 
story of law's dialogue with power structures is much more complex than a 
mere claim that the more powerful are treated more advantageously. The 
legal response to different individuals is shaped, to a great extent by the 
thought patterns and inner workings of legal discourse, at least as much as 
by the interests and maneuvers of personal and professional interests of 
groups and individuals. 
II. THE CASE STUDY: HOW DOES THE ISRAELI MILIT AR Y JUSTICE SYSTEM 
PERCEIVE. AND ADDRESS, DISOBEDIENCE TO SERVE IN THE ARMY? 
The case study observes the construction of a legal concept-the criminalization 
of disobedience-through the eyes of the Israeli military justice system. 
While every case study has features that make it idiosyncratic and problematic 
to generalize from, the subject of this article is a system that closely resembles 
the Israeli civilian criminal justice system, in the tradition of Anglo-American 
law.2 The military justice system is a smaller, more specialized sibling of the 
civilian one. Its jurisdiction extends over all soldiers, who are subject to 
a dual system of laws: the civilian and the military criminal courts (Finkelstein 
and Tomer 2002; Mudrik 1991). Military courts have priority whenever a criminal 
incident has any military-related features. Soldiers can be tried in the military 
system for any civilian criminal offense-from petty offenses to murder-as 
well as for military offenses, which are defined in the Military Justice Act, 
Ie) 2008 The Author 
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1955. Criminal procedure in the military system, also prescribed by the 
Military Justice Act, is almost identical to civilian criminal procedure. The 
act itself, like much of Israel's civilian criminal law and procedure, is an imported 
version of the equivalent British legislation, albeit heavily amended and 
reformed. There are, however, some significant differences: prosecutorial 
discretion in the army includes the option to indict the soldier in a small-
scale "disciplinary hearing" before a lay commander, a process that is not 
subjected to procedural or evidentiary rules, and that does not entail a 
criminal record. Also, if a soldier is discharged from service, he or she 
ceases to be subjected to military jurisdiction. These features make the 
system slightly less residual than the civilian system, though the latter also 
offers various extralegal mechanisms for diverting cases away from the 
courts. It should also be mentioned that the system is of relatively small 
size, comprised of eight jurisdictions across the country, and employing a 
total of no more than two hundred officers (judges, prosecutors, and defense 
attorneys). A typical career at the Military Justice system often involves 
changing roles and locations every few years. These size and organization 
features yield much familiarity between officers who are "repeat players" 
and create close-knit courtroom communities (Nardulli 1978). While classic 
courtroom ethnographies often had to be limited to one or two criminal 
courtroom settings (Feeley 1979; Maynard 1984). this legal system can be 
studied in its entirety, which makes it an ideal setting for a study focusing 
on a variety of knowledge-production sites. 3 
Acts of desertion and conscientious objection can be prosecuted as 
military offenses: Unauthorized Absence from Service (article 94 of the 
Military Justice Act, 1955) and Refusing to Obey an Order (article 102 of 
the Military Justice Act). Both offenses, imported from British military 
legislation, were designed for an imperial army fighting away from home. 
In the Israeli context, however, they receive an entirely different meaning, 
as legal mechanisms to conceptualize and repress acts of defiance that constitute 
a challenge to the formative Israeli ethos of compulsory military service. 
Ever since the inauguration of Israel as an independent state in 1948, military 
service has not only been a duty based on the Security Service Act ( [combined 
version], 1986), but also an important aspect of Israeli identity. In its early 
years, military service was designed to be a "melting-pof' for the Israeli 
multicultural society (Kimmerling 1971; Levy 2003). It is also credited for 
supplying social legitimacy and material advantages (Barnett 1992): in public 
debates, it is common to invoke one's military background as a justification 
to present a knowledgeable opinion (Vald 1992; also see Chacham 2004). 
However, the seemingly egalitarian model of military service has not remained 
unchallenged; members of certain social groups are exempted from service. 
a topic constantly under public debate (Margalit and Halbertal 1998). The 
army's participation in ethically debated activities has produced waves of 
resistance, particularly in the Lebanon war (Linn 1996a; Sheleff 1987) and 
the 1988 Intifada (Kidron 2004: Linn 1996a). The inadequacies of the army 
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as a "melting pot" have received somewhat less critical attention, but some 
studies argue that the army does not ameliorate, but rather reproduces and 
aggravates, social inequalities, through gender- and ethnicity-based discrim-
ination (Kirnmerling 1971; Levy 2003; Smoocha 1984). 
While the two study groups-deserters and conscientious objectors-
challenge the military service ethos, they do so from very different places in 
the Israeli social order. Conscientious objectors, described by themselves 
and by others as members of the Israeli middle class, left-wing intelligentsia 
(Chacham 2004; Linn 1996a, 1996b), choose to exit the military service 
framework based on political dissent and opt to mobilize their political 
views through alternative mechanisms: academic and public debate as well 
as political activism. Deserters, on the other hand, represent the weakest 
social groups in Israeli society; the offenders, often new immigrants or 
working-class youngsters, often explain their absence from service as 
stemming from economic difficulties in their families. The few military 
studies on desertion confirm that the poor, the undereducated, and the 
ethnically marginalized are significantly and strongly overrepresented in the 
deserter population (Borkov 1992; Gahelet 2000; Rosenberg and Gorny 
1965). Therefore, while the former group challenges national ethos based on 
an ideological divide, the latter group "opts out" due to a socio-cultural 
one.4 
IlL METHODOLOGY 
The research was designed to identify the epistemological structure behind 
the military justice system's perception and treatment of desertion and con-
scientious objection. Rather than explaining the difference in terms of legal 
doctrine, social differences, or organizational features (such as, for example, 
heavy caseloads), the goal was to examine how the legal system created 
truth and utilized it in its policy toward desertion and conscientious 
objection, and how much of this truth was the product of legal principles, 
extralegal ways to frame the problems, or an assimilation of the latter into 
the framework of the former. For this purpose, the study used a multimethod 
design (Creswell 1994; Jupp 1989), observing four "sites" in the legal system: 
the indictment stage, courtroom hearings, legal reasoning in verdicts, and-
for deserters only-quantitative analysis of verdict outcomes. In each of 
these sites, the findings were analyzed to answer the following questions: 
How does the system perceive the problem? Which bodies of knowledge 
shape this perception? How does the policy reflect these perceptions and 
knowledge sources? 
The indictment "site" focuses on prosecutorial decision making. It uses 
military archival material and in-depth interviews with prosecutors to 
explicate indictment policies through the ethos of compulsory and egalitarian 
military service and its two corollaries: the ethical, defensive nature of the 
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army ('"it is ethical to serve") and its populist nature ('"everyone can serve"). 
This section compares the case-by-case, inquisitive, philosophical care in 
which conscientious objectors' cases are examined and eliminated from the 
system's docket. to the bureaucratic, arithmetic method in which desertion 
cases are brought to court. This section also explains why the following 
sections, which address later stages in the legal process, involve so many 
desertion cases and so few conscientious objectors' cases. I see the difference 
in numbers of cases in the postindictment stages not as a methodological 
hurdle. but as a finding in itself. which stems as much from the prosecutorial 
concern about the potential for political discourse in court as from its lack 
of concern about challenges to the socio-economic structure. 
The courtroom hearing "site" is based on an analysis of extensive court-
room observations of deserter and conscientious objector trials, conducted 
almost daily in military courts between June and October of 2003. supple-
mented with in-depth interviews of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
judges. The observations cover procedural practices as well as substantive 
content and informal interactions within the courtroom, and seek to find a 
connection between the respective "voices" of the two groups of offenders 
and the amount of flexibility in form and content of the legal process. 
The legal reasoning "'site" examines the legal system's most explicit discursive 
product: the verdict. In my content analysis of eighty-five randomly selected 
deserter verdicts and the two lengthy verdicts in the conscientious objectors' 
cases,s I identify the realms of knowledge used by the judges to construct a 
"'truth" about the problems and offenders it addressed. The analysis relied 
on coded key phrases, narratives, redundancies, omissions. and value state-
ments in order to produce a picture of legal thoughts on social problems 
(Bogoch and Don-Yichya 1999); but beyond these indicators, it sought to 
figure out the extent to which the social and political issues underlying the 
problems \\ere allowed to enter the legal language and the ways in which 
they were assimilated, modified, and reneated within it. 
The fourth and final "site" examines the infiltration of knowledge about 
desertion to the actual outcome of the case-the severity of the sentence-
using a linear regression model. Unfortunately. due to the screening processes 
described in the first "site," this section only addresses desertion cases, whose 
numbers allowed for large-scale quantitative analysis. The regression model 
examined the correlations between the imprisonment sentence for deserters 
and a set of fifty-five variables, \\hich were coded directly from 853 randomly 
sampled military verdicts of deserters hied in the years 2000-200.2. The reason 
for this source \\as that the model was meant to reflect not the "'reality" of 
sentencing, but the patterns as the judges saw them. For the project's purposes, 
the independent variables \\ere divided between three groups: doctrinal 
\ ariables (length of absence. criminal record), system \'ariables (the identity 
of the legal actors, plea bargains and defense tactics), and socio-economic 
aspects pertaining to the offenders' particular problems. The model was 
coded and run using the SPSS soft\\are package version 12.0, particularly 
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the Stepwise regression option. Running recursive models has ~ever~l 
methodological shortcomings; however, it proved a useful tool In thIs 
particular section of the study, which followed a "ground theory" approach, 
in the sense that no preliminary assumptions were made as to the prevalence 
of legal or extralegal factors in the decision-making process. 
IV. FINDINGS 
A. HOW DISOBEDIENCE BECOMES A CRIMINAL CASE: A GENEALOGY OF 
CRIMINALIZA TION 
Policy decisions addressing disobedience, including the prosecutorial 
decision to indict. occur in an epistemological space. Any decision to prosecute 
a deserter or a conscientious objector builds on a body of preconceived 
knowledge: an understanding about the nature of the problem, the people 
involved in it, and the way it should be addressed (Frohmann 1997). As 
prosecutorial policies in desertion and conscientious objectors' cases show, 
in both cases the decision to indict has to synthesize two contradictory 
notions: the classicist, criminal law notion of individuals as autonomous 
moral agents whose choice contradicts the monolithic public good and the 
external narratives that suggest a more ambiguous picture. In both cases. 
the external narratives are transformed into legal considerations, and, as 
such, they influence the knowledge that surrounds the prosecutorial 
decision. 
The classicist view of disobedient people as criminals is constructed 
through the formative ethos of compulsory and egalitarian military service. 
The army's popular image is that of an institution of the Israeli people in 
which everyone shares the duty and privilege to defend their nation against 
its surrounding enemies (Almog 1997; Levy 2003). This ethos constructs 
military service not only as a legal duty, but as one which embodies positive 
social values. It is the legitimate. socially approved choice; dissent and 
disobedience are criminalized. This duality rests on the premise that serving 
in the army is not only mandatory, but also viable and possible under all 
circumstances. According to the ethos, the army presents no ethical 
challenges due to its defensive character, according to which it only engages 
in ethical practices that are necessary for the country's survival (its very 
name-Israel Defense Force-supports this narrative). An ethical army, by 
definition. is never engaged in immoral missions, and therefore does not 
present any moral dilemmas to its soldiers (Levy 2003; Pappe 1993). 
Similarly, military service is never placed in conflict with familial obligations 
or socio-economic necessities; in an egalitarian "army of the people," the 
military welfare authorities make sure that every soldier in need receives 
support and financial aid. which assure that everyone not only has to serve, 
but is able to do so. The corollary of these formative ideas is that anyone 
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who opts out of military service, by suggesting that this legal duty conflicts 
with his or her conscience or necessities, is consciously making the wrong 
(albeit free) choice and is therefore fully accountable for his or her actions. 
The monolithic narrative leaves no room for questioning the moral rightness 
of military activities or the conflict between service and familial or financial 
necessi ties. 
External considerations, however, do knock on the door. In the conscien-
tious objectors' cases, they are presented as alternative readings of the 
political situation: the offenders argue that participating in military activities 
means committing immoral acts. The law is not deaf to the problematic and 
challenging nature of this argument; however, due to the classicist premise 
of monolithic "good" and free choice, it cannot accept it as face value. Instead, 
it transforms the moral argument into a model of personal difficulty. Since 
the army's activities in the territories are ethicaL the objectors are, naturally, 
"wrong" in their refusal to serve. However, the army is prepared to make 
certain concessions to them, which do not stem from ethical uncertainty, 
but rather from a bona fide attempt to accommodate their (misguided) 
consciences. The official policy in conscientious objector cases has been 
based on a distinction between pacifists ("full objectors"), who are exempted 
from service on a case-by-case basis, and people whose objection stems 
from political dissent ("selective objectors") who are criminalized. Personnel 
documents from the early 2000s include lists of hundreds of high school 
seniors (potential regular service soldiers) who signed petitions against the 
occupation. For each of these cases, the list specifies the potential fate of 
the case: whether the objector appeared to be a pacifist or a political dissenter; 
whether the objector's parents could be used to convince them to serve; and 
whether they had a personal history of mental problems or narcotics that 
could lead to their quiet dismissal from service for other reasons. Objectors 
that insisted not to serve were awarded a lengthy hearing at the military 
"conscience committee," formed in 1995. The committee was comprised of 
officers from the personnel units, a legal officer, and (since 2002) a volunteer 
professor of philosophy. This peculiar choice indicates the realm of knowledge 
that the committee relied on: it was not preoccupied with the objectors' 
honesty, but rather with their philosophical viewpoints. Co-opting and 
modifying the Rawlsian concepts of conscientious objection and civil 
disobedience, the committee interrogated objectors, their lawyers, and wit-
nesses about the grounds for their refusal to serve, attempting to convince 
them of their mistake. In the early 2000s, the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict led to the emergence of a new "objection frontier" (Leibovitz-Dar 
2000), comprised of reservists and high school students. This eruption of 
dissent yielded a military policy according to which objectors were not 
indicted, but rather tried in disciplinary hearings and sentenced to short 
prison terms. During their incarceration, the objectors received various 
offers to serve under special terms (such as service at a hospital with no 
uniform, no weapons, and no basic training). Only if they declined these 
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offers to ""end the matter quietly," and continued refusing to serve, they 
would be prosecuted. These diversionary techniques led to the fact that 
only two cases, featuring six regular service soldiers, eventually reached the 
military courts. These two cases, the Y oni Ben Artzi case (Headquarters 
129/03) and the five political objectors' case (Headquarters 151, 174, 205, 
222, 243/03), are analyzed at length in this project. 
In desertion cases, external considerations knock on the door in the form 
of the deserter population's problematic demographics. The prosecutors I 
interviewed, who indicted deserters, encountered dozens of cases every day, 
in which, invariably, the defendants explained their absence in terms of 
socio-economic hardships and family emergencies. Moreover, the prosecutors 
were aware that desertion had "a lot to do" with socio-economic hardships 
and were familiar with some of the military studies that suggested this link. 
Nevertheless, in the interviews, the prosecutors maintained that financial 
and familial misfortunes did not eliminate the choice to serve despite one's 
problems ("All in all it's a question of values. I can tell you that, no matter 
what my circumstances were, I would never desert" (Interview #1). Most 
of them expressed faith in the army's welfare mechanisms as a means to 
financially provide for soldiers, even though none of them knew the particular 
amounts and conditions ("I'm assuming the army gives people everything 
they need" (Interview #38». However, the classicistic image of deserters as 
autonomous agents clashed with the large, and growing, numbers of cases 
in which defendants framed their actions in the context of external difficulties. 
Like in the conscientious objectors' cases, here, too, legal policy found a 
way to incorporate and encapsulate these contradictory notions in a way 
that did not challenge the monolithic ethos of military service. 
The threat of deserters was constructed by prosecutors and policymakers 
as lying not in the individual case, but in the bulk of cases as a whole. 
Prosecutors were quick to note that desertion accounted for more than 50 
percent of the military courts' workload (a fact confirmed by the unit's yearly 
activity reports (Military Advocate General Corps Activity Reports 2001, 
2002», which, to them, indicated the difficulties faced by military unit com-
manders who contacted them and voiced their concerns about the growth 
of the phenomenon ("They keep telling us to increase punishment, because 
they don't understand" (Interview #35». They also mentioned their frustration 
with allocating a large percentage of their workday for handling these cases, 
which offered them no professional challenge or interest and diverted their 
energy away from more complex legal cases ("When I have a sexual abuse 
case I want to put in days and nights, whereas with these cases ... there's 
no comparison at all" (Interview #4». 
The prosecutorial understanding of desertion as a "bulk threat" yielded 
a highly formalized, bureaucratized prosecutorial response mechanism. 
A specialized unit, the Desertion and Unauthorized Absence Prosecution, 
manufactured identical indictments by the dozen on an average day, basing 
their decision almost exclusively on one parameter: the length of absence 
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from service. This easy-to-apply standard, incorporated into Military 
Prosecution Instruction 2.04, was perceived to provide a measurable indicator 
for the severity of the offense.6 According to prosecutorial guidelines. 
deserters whose absences exceeded forty-five days were to be tried in court; 
shorter absences (about 70 percent of the cases) were handled through 
disciplinary procedures in the unit or in military prisons. With the escalation 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2000, desertion rates rose, a phenomenon 
linked by the media with the economic crisis prompted by the escalation 
(Glickman 2003; Harel 2002; Rabin 2002). This led to more lax policies, 
which informally raised the minimum absence period for indictment to sixty 
days. Desertion prosecutors repeatedly referred to their job as a "technical" 
one, and to desertion files as "repetitive" and "boring": 
Sometimes I get here and feel like I'm a machine, like when there's a [military 
police arrest) operation ... I take a pile of cases and just process humongous 
amounts, like sixty cases a day. I can do a case in a minute, half a minute, and 
then you can't really go into their personal circumstances .. after three years 
here my brain has gone into entropy and I can read the cases upside down. 
(Interview #29) 
Several things should be noted. First, at the base of each prosecutorial deci-
sion are classicistic constructions of disobedience as a matter of personal and 
misguided choice, setting aside pluralistic considerations of alternative 
moralities or social inequalities. Second, in both cases, the pluralistic 
considerations are reinterpreted and included in the indictment policy. 
However, while both problems represent threats to different aspects of the 
same ethos, the nature of this threat is different. The potential threat of 
conscientious objectors is rooted in their individual moral and intellectual 
resources. The army's unwillingness to engage in philosophical debate 
within the legal arena propels it to make substantial efforts to resolve 
conflicts in an informal, individualized, quiet manner. The potential threat 
of deserters-seen as a disempowered, silent minority with socio-economic 
difficulties-lies not in their individual arguments, but in the argument 
emerging from their large and increasing numbers, which problematizes the 
ethos of a "people's army." The army's unwillingness to ask questions 
about the nature of compulsory service leads it to a bureaucratized policy 
of prosecuting by numbers (Sudnow 1965), while preserving the rhetoric of 
personal choice for cases which reach the court. 
B HOW DISOBEDIENCE IS DISCUSSED IN COURT: flEXIBILITY, 
CONTENT, AND VOICE OF THE OFFENDERS IN HEARINGS 
Observing the legal proceedings in deserters' and conscientious objectors' 
cases revealed an adherence to the classicist narrative of choice in both 
cases, while introducing the extralegal issues (political dissent for objectors, 
social inequalities for deserters) in predefined, limited places within the 
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process. There was, however, a difference in the extent to which the legal 
arena was willing to accommodate these external considerations. Conscientious 
objectors' trials were much more flexible in form, and allowed for the inclusion 
of more diverse content into the legal framework; this was, to a great 
extent, owed to the salience and voice of the offenders within the process. 
Deserter trials, on the other hand, were characterized by strict adherence to 
a routine format, constrained content defined almost exclusively by formal 
legal requirements, and a weak, mediated voice of the offenders. 
Deserters were often tried in court in batches of ten to twenty cases per 
morning, before a single judge. The trial style was defined by the actors as 
an "assembly line." Trials with plea bargains were remarkably similar to 
trials with open sentencing (the latter were slightly slower: see Nardulli 
1978); negotiation between the parties, though informal (Maynard 1984), 
did not change the nature of courtroom dynamics. The prosecution presented 
documentation relating to the absence; the defense presented welfare, 
medical andlor mental health documentation, and occasionally produced 
testimonies from the defendants or their family members telling of the situation 
at home, who were cross-examined by the prosecution in a more-or-less 
uniform fashion. One of my interviewees, a young prosecutor, handed me a 
ready-made printed form with cross-examination questions for defendants, 
which she had created and distributed among all deserter prosecutors in the 
district (Interview #19). 
The judge remained relatively passive, stopping the stream of cases only 
when something hindered the smooth progress of the day, such as a Russian-
speaking defendant who required a translator. A middle-class witness, such 
as an employer or a former commander taking interest in the defendant and 
coming to testify, was considered a rare event. and in the one instance it 
occurred, the witness was treated with great respect and interest. One of the 
prosecutors commented: "It's real rare that commanders show up ... I 
mean, they don't have time, but also, you know, it's not very likely that 
deserters will ever go back to the unit, right?" (Interview #18). Order and 
quiet in the courtroom were strictly maintained, and verdicts were read to 
the defendants in formal language, sometimes followed by a quasi-parental 
"word of advice' from the judge warning them not to commit future 
absences ("Next time I won't be so lenient with you. I hope we won't see 
you here again. ,. Field notes from courtroom observations, 22 September). 
By contrast, the court was extremely flexible in procedural requirements 
in conscientious ohjectors' trials. In one of its decisions about allowing 
certain testimony, it even stated explicitly that it intended to provide th~ 
objectors with every possible means to present their perspectives. Thus, the 
trials included lengthy testimonies; in one of them, the five defendants were 
allowed to present their world views one after the other before any of them 
was cross-examined. In the other trial, high-ranked military offl~ials were 
summoned as defense hostile witnesses and cross-examined for hours. The 
court exhibited remarkable tolerance to the appearance and behavior of the 
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defendants and their supporters: the defendants were allowed to appear in 
civilian clothes, political side remarks from the audience were ignored or 
addressed forgivingly, and the court even agreed to negotiate its recess 
policy with a defendant's mother who rose from the audience (''I'm the 
mother of one of the defendants, and we have many supporters outside 
who want to come in, and it's really crowded here. If we had a break, we 
could have a 'changing of the guard' " "Okay, ma'am, we'll keep going 
for about fifteen minutes and then we'll take a break." Field notes from 
courtroom observations. 18 September). 
The difference between the trial styles was even more evident in the 
content of the hearings. Deserter cases, always following a guilty plea, seldom 
strayed from the routine narrative based on the "ends of punishment"-
deterrence, retribution, and a narrow interpretation of rehabilitation as the 
likelihood that the offender would return to normative service. The default 
assumption was that the offender was an autonomous. free-willed being 
(Hudson 1987, 1993) who chose his or her personal welfare above the service 
duty. While prosecutorial cross-examination questions repetitively prodded 
in this direction by suggesting the legitimate paths available to the defendant 
("Why didn't you talk to your commander? Why didn't you wait to hear 
from welfare? Why don't your brothers help at home?"), the defense line 
did not question the prevalence of military over personal obligations but 
made use of a discourse of mercy and quasi-therapeutic language to diminish 
the range of choice available to the defendant. As one of the interviewees. a 
veteran defense attorney, explained. "The defense attorney's work basically 
consists of painting a picture of great misery" (Interview #36). The defendant's 
socio-economic background was never discussed as a general feature of 
desertion cases, but only as the specific offender's personal mitigating 
circumstances. 
The content of conscientious objector trials was much more colorful and 
diverse. The court, partly in response to issues brought up by the prosecution 
and the defense, allowed extensive discussion of issues that, from a narrow 
perspective, would be deemed irrelevant: the defendants' personal histories 
and world views-an "etiology of ideology" of sorts. The court and the parties 
encouraged the defendants and witnesses to elaborate not only on their 
childhood formative experiences (Ben Artzi's sister was asked to relay 
stories from her brother's antics and protests in junior high schooll. but 
on their perspectives about the general questions brought up: what counted 
as a pacifist world view (in the Ben Artzi case) and what constituted, or 
should have constituted, an issue of conscience (in the five objectors' case). 
These were not external questions garnishing the legal discussion: the 
court's substantive agenda was organized around them. The court also 
enabled the defense to criticize military authorities, such as drafting officers 
and the conscience committee. 
The difference in procedure and content was largely due to the different 
roles played by the defendants in the two types of cases. While deserters 
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were brought to trial from detention cells, wearing prison uniforms, cuffed 
in their hands and feet, and under heavy military police escort, objectors 
appeared in civilian clothes, entering the courtroom to an applause from 
the large audience, comprised of their unmistakably middle-class families 
and political supporters. Deserters were hardly heard in court; their voices 
were heavily mediated by their defense attorneys, who feared they would 
damage themselves in self-testimony. One of the interviewees, in a self-
reflective moment, commented: "The problem is we're making the judge's 
job easier. It's much more convenient for the judge to hear the reality in 
dolled-up legalese from the defense attorney who says 'difficult economic 
situation.' Who knows what would happen if we had them tell the story in 
their own words?" (Interview #12). When the defendants did speak, it was 
mostly to ask for mercy before the verdict, and they were often shy and 
hindered by language and articulation barriers. 
Conscientious objectors, on the other hand, testified at length, clearly and 
articulately, did not hesitate to rephrase questions posed to them in cross-
examination, and often glanced at the court typist's official monitor, to see 
whether they were quoted correctly. 
What led to the creation of such polar models, resembling a bureaucratic 
assembly line in one type of cases and an epistemological discussion in the 
other?7 Beyond the difference in numbers of cases, which probably led to a 
trivialization and routinization of the deserters' cases (Eisenstein and Jacob 
1977; Sudnow 1965), the two genres seem to follow two very different agendas, 
which dictate the system's cognitive openness to encompass philosophical 
issues and personal "etiology of ideology" as essential information to shape 
its knowledge in one case and its closure to any issue beyond the formalities 
of caseload management in the other. 
In the deserter cases, the institutional agenda is oriented inward, into the 
military courtroom workgroup itself. Through its procedural rules, choices 
of content, allocation of voices, and power in the process, the system strives 
to perpetuate itself and its policy respecting desertion. The focus seems to 
be, in the short run, to facilitate the smooth flow of the workday, to deal 
with exceptions in a way that reinforces the rules, and to minimize conflict; 
in the long run, the system wishes to maintain precedents as simple guidelines, 
to allow for equally smooth workdays in the future. The autopoietic nature 
of deserter case management is, therefore, technical and endogenous, and 
does not require any openness to alternative realms of knowledge. 
By contrast, the agenda in conscientious objector cases is externally 
oriented and includes a more complex twofold message: On the epistemo-
logical leveL the content and form produced in the courtroom are designed 
to reinforce the consensual idea according to which the objectors are morally, 
legally, and politically wrong or misguided.s On the procedural leveL the 
court projects the idea of extreme judicial fairness. In order to avoid potential 
undermining of its legitimate foundation, the court wishes to present itself 
as providing the objectors with every possible opportunity of proving themselves 
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right and allows itself to compromise form and content for this purpose. 
These two seemingly contradictory messages are, in fact, two sides of the 
same coin: the military position on the conscientious objection question can 
be shown to be legitimate only through extremely fair processes. thus 
making the discussion apolitical and fair. The outward-bound nature of this 
agenda requires the court to expand its cognitive openness and to allow 
at least for external terminology to inform it about the problem. while 
maintaining ultimate control (and normative closure) about the manner in 
which this terminology is assimilated into the legal process and applied to 
the case. 
C. HOW DISOBEDIENCE IS CONSTRUCTED IN LEGAL REASONING: 
PROBLEM PERCEPTIONS AND REALMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN COURT 
VERDICTS 
The dialogue between legal reasoning and extralegal perceptions of the 
problems is showcased in the court's most basic legal communication: its 
final product. the verdict. In verdicts of both deserters and conscientious 
objectors, not only did the court present its perspectives on the problem, 
the subjects, and the suitable strategies and technologies for its solution, but 
in addition it disclosed important underlying information: the disciplines 
and realms of knowledge it utilized to shape its perspective on the problem. 
Desertion was seen, first and foremost, as a criminal offense. The verdict's 
narrative invariably began by stating the length of absence and other infor-
mation pertinent to the offense, and supplied the offender's motive for the 
offense (often economic or medical hardships in the family. which preceded 
the offense) later, in a fragmented, nonchronological manner. The style of 
these descriptions often foreshadowed the severity of the verdict. The court 
constructed the defendants into two categories: "the rule"-free-willed 
individuals who had made a selfish choice to absent themselves from the 
army-and "the exception"-people who encountered hardships or suffered 
from serious personal adjustment problems that make them somewhat less 
blameworthy. The first group was characterized by expressions such as 
"chose," "took the law into his own hands," and "forced his will on the 
army," conveying a message of manipulation and selfishness: 
I have weighed the matter of the defendant. My impression is that his main 
difficulties are not in the economic level, but in his will to exit the unit in which 
he serves. The defendant actually did not take any legal measures to try and 
solve his problems and chose a path of absence from service. (North 316/00: 1) 
The second group's circumstances were described more sympathetically, 
using words such as "distress," "harsh circumstances," "disability," "unfitness," 
and "had to desert." These soldiers were not exempted from responsibility, 
but the individualization of their circumstances as exceptional allowed the 
court to use a less harsh tone: 
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The only question I am facing is whether to impose an imprisonment sentence 
on the defendant. My answer to this question is that since the defendant has 
been dismissed from service based on a mental health profile there is no room 
to impose an imprisonment sentence on him ... it would be better if the 
military authorities would identify the disabilities of soldiers of his kind even 
before the draft so that the soldier would not have been drafted to service at 
all, because he is not fit for service in his condition. (North 457/00: I) 
Through these two categories, the court made a narrow "window" for 
introducing extralegal considerations. The categories allowed the court to 
make sense of the deserters: they were either "manipulators," autonomous 
agents in defiance of the rule of law, or "victims' of particularly difficult 
circumstances. By reducing the issue of social inequality to individualized 
mitigating circumstances, the court allowed some discussion of the underlying 
issues, while limiting the potential for generalization and problematization. 
The two conscientious objector verdicts were far more lengthy and 
detailed. In them, conscientious objection was portrayed as dangerous 
behavior, whose harm stemmed from the individualism, candidness, and 
self-conviction of the intelligent, articulate defendants. Any tolerance for 
objection was perceived as a risk of politicizing the army, dividing the 
population within the army, persuading others with subversive rhetoric, and 
snubbing common sense by assuming that everyone else is mistaken. The 
questions that interested the court were a compromise between the 
pertinent legal question of guilt and the epistemological issues brought up 
by the defendants and their attorneys (Khanin, Sfard and Rotbard 2004). In 
the Ben Artzi trial. the court was interested in the power and authority of an 
external body (the conscience committee) to define pacifist beliefs. and in "the 
five" trial, the court was interested in the conceptual meaning of conscience 
and whether it could be broadened to include political considerations. 
These expanded interests led the court to an interesting, and uneasy, dialogue 
between law and political philosophy. While the court bOlTowed philosophical 
terms from the Rawlsian theoretical realm, it merely used them as labels for 
its own classifications. In the Ben Artzi case, the traditional legal distinction 
between "absolute" pacifism and "selective' refusal on political grounds 
was reinforced partly because of its supposedly easy application. In the five 
objectors' case, the court made a distinction between "conscientious objection," 
which it defined as refusal based on the need to personally dissociate oneself 
from actions perceived as immoral, and "civil disobedience:' defined as a 
refusal aimed at convincing others in the wrongness of the disputed law.9 
Other realms of knowledge received even lesser respect; when the defense in 
the five objectors' trial wished to dispute the (empirical) claim that 
acknowledging conscientious objection might be extensively misused, the 
court replied, in a classical autopoietic argument, that it had all the knowledae 
it needed to evaluate risk-in Supreme Court precedents: b 
We are speaking of matters that are known to everyone, thinQs that were 
claimed again and again in front of the different courts, and adopted by them. 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of Justice, stated the main 
part of these doubts and dangers, and adopted them as a cause and a reason 
to avoid assisting the petitioners, who had addressed it asking to legally 
recognize their refusal to perform military service. (Headquarters 151. 174, 
205, 222. 243/03: 7) 
As with deserters, the court was obsessed with classifying, simplifying, and 
understanding the objectors: it ventured to the defendants' personal 
histories in order to extract the "dominant" motive for their actions: 
We found that we are close to the opinion ... according to which, although the 
possibility of duality in motives is possible, it is, in general, a theoretical and 
distant possibility. We thought that the main motive hiding behind the actions 
of the defendants before us, considering the totality of circumstances surrounding 
their actions, is the will to cause a political change, that is, to bring about a 
change in public opinion and the governmental policy. We doubt whether the 
conscientious motive, in itself, is enough to be a basis to the defendants' 
refusal, based on the totality of the things they said. Yet, we are ready to avoid 
stating unambiguously, that the civil disobedience motive is the only one 
moving the defendants, and to assume, that it is also a motive of conscientious 
objection which moves them, perhaps even as a sufficient motive, to commit 
the act of refusal. (Headquarters 151, 174, 205, 222, 243/03: 75; emphasis in 
original) 
In the Ben Artzi case, while the court was unable to comfortably pigeonhole 
the defendant's beliefs as either pacifistic or political/subversive, it sought to 
unify and harmonize them: 
Is the inability to adjust to the military framework a consequence of the pacifist 
belief, or perhaps the pacifist belief is the cause [sic-probably meant "result"] 
of the inability to adjust to, or to accept, the existence of a military framework, 
whose goals are defined the way they are defined, and whose means are the way 
they are?! (Headquarters 129/03: 23) 
The defendant distinguished ... between the pacifist belief and the political 
view (though it is clear that a pacifistic view will be difficult to reconcile with 
a different political view). (ibid.: 32, 33) 
The tendency to reduce and simplify human complexities for the sake of 
legal decision was evident in deserters' and in conscientious objectors' cases. 
In both cases, when seeking an "understanding" of the defendants, the 
court opted for individualization rather than for an open discussion of the 
general extralegal arguments underlying the issues. However, there were 
differences in the content of the classifications. With deserters, the court 
looked more favorably upon helpless, weak defendants, who were more 
victims of their circumstances than selfish manipulators. With conscientious 
objectors, the court sought articulate individuals, whose well-defined ideology 
was isolated and manageable. Though the objectors were given much more 
respect and voice than the deserters, and though conscientious objectors' 
verdicts were more cognitively open to assimilate "external" content, pertaining 
to the extralegal, political framing of the problem, in both cases legal 
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reasoning remained, eventually, normatively closed to different perspectives 
on the issues themselves. 
D. HOW DISOBEDIENCE IS MEASURED: A QUANTITATIVE EXAMINATION 
OF SENTENCES FOR DESERTION 
Finally. the study examined the interplay of legal and extralegal factors in 
a non textual "site"-the sentence. As explained above. due to the small 
number of conscientious objectors who reached the trial stage, this section 
of the study refers to deserters alone. 
The main finding from the model was that, contrary to several assumptions 
highlighted in realist socio-Iegal research. and consistent with other large-scale 
sentencing quantitative studies (Flemming. Nardulli and Eisenstein 1992), the 
criminal sentence was, first and foremost, a function of traditional, doctrinally 
defined factors. The strongest and most significant explanatory variable 
was, by far. the length of absence from service, which. as mentioned above, 
was regarded by all actors in the system as the most accurate indicator of 
the severity of the otTense. The strong correlation between length of absence 
and length of prison sentence was evident in linear, logarithmic, and cluster 
bivariate regressions, and particularly salient for absences not exceeding 
one year (see Figure 1).10 
Subsequently, a multivariate regression was run,ll resulting in an explanatory 
model that predicted punishment for deserters as a function of the twelve 
significant varialbles. Bivariate analysis for each variable was also conducted. 
Table 1 showcases the significant variables,12 classifying them according to 
their nature: variables corresponding to a doctrinaL "law in the books" 
approach (severity of the offense, criminal record); trial-related variables 
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Figure 1. Imprisonment as a Function of Length of Absence, for Absences Not 
Exceeding One Year: Linear and Logarithmic Regressions. 
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Table 1. A Classification of Significant Variables, According to the Theoretical 
Framework They Support and Their Bivariate Regression R-Square Values 
Strong 
Explanatory 
Power (R Square >=0.2) 
Medium 
Explanatory Power 
(1 =< R square < 0.2) 
Weak Explanatory 
Power 
(R Square < 0.1) 
Doctrinal 
Variables 














Assistance from Unit 
Parental Marital Status 
(court and lawyers); and defendant-related variables (the defendant's 
circumstances as described by the court). 
As the table shows, the court's sentencing policy corresponded most strongly 
with the doctrinal variables-length of absence, used as an index of severity, 
and criminal record-and was considerably less influenced by extralegal 
factors, system- or offender-related. The third and fourth strongest variables 
in the regression-service status at the time of trial and involvement in 
alcohol/narcotics-suggest that the court treated more leniently soldiers 
who, due to their circumstances, were either out of the system, or on their 
way out of it. According to the Personnel Unit's Standing Instruction k-30-
01-07, drug and/or alcohol abuse are almost automatic grounds for discharge; 
therefore, soldiers with such problems would naturally leave the army and 
consequently not repeat the offenses, thus rendering a deterrent sentence 
unnecessary.13 The remaining significant variables had a very small effect on 
the model. Socio-economic economic factors, which were often mentioned 
by the judges as mitigating circumstances, were almost completely absent from 
the model, except for three variables, and even those reflected hidden social 
prejudices more than they reflected genuine consideration of the circum-
stances. 14 As to trial-related variables, the model revealed that defense strategies, 
such as plea bargaining, did not make much difference. The two other variables 
concerning trial circumstances-number of judges and representation by reserve 
service attorneys-have rather mundane, bureaucratic explanations. 15 
V. DISCUSSION: HOW DISOBEDIENCE IS JURIDIFIED 
The main common finding from the four "sites" is a reinforced acknowl-
edgment of the power of law to dominate and produce knowledge. including 
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the "translation" and adaptation of extralegal knowledge into its own logic 
and vocabulary. In its process of understanding and addressing disobedience, 
law came in direct conflict with alternative narratives. In the conscientious 
objectors' cases, the legal monolithic definition of ethical behavior-compliance 
and military service-is directly challenged by individuals who argue for a 
different perspective on the morality of the situation, in which their conscience 
requires them not to serve. In desertion cases, the resistance to the monolithic 
definition of legal behavior is much less vocal; by preferring to work or help 
their families, deserters challenge the notion that military service is a viable 
option for them and challenge the assumption of equality underlying the 
duty to serve. In both cases, the challenges say something not only about 
the rule of law, but also about legal knowledge; they introduce alternative 
frameworks that illuminate the problems from a different perspective. Law 
does not operate in ignorance of these challenges; nor does it engage in 
direct dialogue with the competing discourses. What it does is introduce 
concepts and fragments from the challenging realms into the legal decision-
making process, in a way that enhances, but does not hinder or modify, the 
main premises of the criminal justice process. In both cases, the external 
narratives are reduced into Weberian "ideal types"-mutually exclusive 
categories that, in their turn, help the legal system classify the cases at hand 
and make sense of them. While this modern, rational method is not endemic 
to law, it is certainly used by law to a great extent (law is, in this respect, an 
important defining phenomenon of modernity (Trubek 1986; Weber and 
Eisenstadt 1968)). In the cases of both deserters and conscientious objectors, 
the process and its content, though cognitively open to influences of external 
disciplines, was eventually dominated by legal rationality, which was the 
definitive factor in reaching the outcomes. This prevalence of law illustrates 
and verifies the autopoietic concept of law as a self-referential system, 
which is normatively closed despite being cognitively open (Teubner 1989). 
Legal vocabulary had an interesting interaction with the external realms 
of knowledge that it encountered when addressing the two problems, particu-
larly conscientious objection. Concepts from political philosophy enriched 
and informed the legal discussion of the problem, but its actual usage during 
trial and in the verdict did not resemble its original form. The law recreated 
and constructed philosophical categories to the advantage of its classification 
system, by using concepts assimilated from philosophy as headlines for the 
rational-legal categories into which it classified the defendants. This enabled 
the court to maintain the dual character of its function: making decisions 
based on its own doctrinal premises, while simultaneously obtaining external 
validation and legitimacy to a controversial decision through the disciplinary 
framework advocated by the defendants and their supporters, who would 
potentially undermine the court's legitimacy to try and convict them for 
their moral and political beliefs (Fish 1991). 
It is equally evident, though, that law's dialogue with the external knowledge 
frameworks was different in the two problems studied. For conscientious 
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objectors, the law's prevalence was manifested in the bottom-line outcome 
of the trials (a conviction and a prison sentence), but the legal discussion 
provided the defendants with some important advantages. Introducing 
language from political philosophy into the legal arena and delving into 
epistemological examinations of ideology entitled the defendants to an 
extensive voice throughout the process, which legitimized framing the issue 
of objection as a matter for political and public debate. For this reason, it 
is difficult to say whether the conscientious objectors' brush with the law 
resulted in victory or failure; the full implications of the trials may include 
their spillover into public debate, which have benefited the movement in the 
arenas more important to them and to their struggle. 16 
The picture was significantly different for deserters. In the absence of 
resources for presenting an articulate voice framing their problem in generic 
terms (such as economic inequalities or cultural insensitivities), and facili-
tated by the large numbers of cases, the problem of desertion was addressed 
through a default model creating a highly formalized, bureaucratic strategy 
for trying and sentencing them. The power of precedents and existing prac-
tices enabled the court to create a simplified technical "how-to" method. 
which not only facilitated the smooth flow of routine cases during the 
workday, but also created a self-perpetuating momentum, which led all 
actors-even defense attorneys-to conform to its rigid guidelines. This 
effect oflegal formality goes beyond the mere premise of "underclass oppression" 
suggested by socio-Iegal realism. Such a notion would explain why the 
defense fails to protect the interests of deserters, but not why it fails to try 
and do so. Acknowledging the power of legal indoctrination as a self-
perpetuating mechanism provides a fuller account of how the policy regarding 
deserters came to be. 
How, then, do power and resources, extralegal variables, affect the legal 
process? These social factors lead an interesting dialogue with the legal 
discourse. While formality prevails for both groups of offenders. vocal and 
voiceless alike, the conscientious objectors at least enjoy the possibility to 
introduce their outlook on the problem as a source of knowledge into the legal 
realm. They have the advantage of the system's cognitive openness to their own 
perspective. Even if this advantage does not directly translate into acquittals 
and lenient sentences (normatively favorable outcomes), at least it makes the 
problem salient and interesting enough for the law to give it extensive 
attention and to talk about it partly on the offenders' terms. This attention 
in itself is a resource unavailable to the masses of forgotten, routine. deserter 
cases who fail to present alternative frameworks to the prevalent formality. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
How much can we generalize from the case study? It is possible that other 
groups of offenders, more and less powerful, engage in different types of 
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dialogue with the law and with different degrees of success. The case study 
is problematic in that it does not allow isolating the factor that most 
facilitated the ditTerence between the problems, which could be the difference 
in numbers, in resources, in ideology, or in the Israeli tendency to prioritize 
political issues over socio-economic ones. It may be that law becomes more 
autopoietic when it has more previous sources to rely on and refer to, as in 
the case of deserters. It is not even clear whether isolating these factors 
from each other is possible, since these factors are closely related to each 
other. Be this as it may, the outcome is that the law, which still dominates 
the discussion, is prepared to make more extensive cognitive allowances for 
one group than for the other. Future research on different case studies 
might be helpful in further examining this correlation. 
Finally, the case study shows how approaches based on a critical observation 
of law itself can bridge and inform formalist and realist perspectives on law. 
The case study shows that both aspects are significant in determining legal 
thought and policy. While not discounting the importance of power and 
social structure, careful attention to legal formality allows for understanding 
the thought process through which power is "converted" into legal currency 
by the inner workings of the legal system, a mechanism that merits further 
academic attention. 
HADAR AVIRAM is Associate Professor at UC Hastings College olthe Law. Her research 
interests include sociology of law. criminology and criminal justice. and social movements. 
NOTES 
1. Several authors have offered ways to synthesize the various discursive analytical 
frameworks without oversimplification: such an important task merits its own 
discussion and exceeds the limits of this article (for insightful theoretical analysis 
of these perspectives, see Andersen 2003; Banakar 2003; Cotterell 1995). 
2. It should be mentioned that the military justice system described in this article is 
an entirely different system from the military courts in the occupied territories, 
which were the subject of Lisa Hajjar's recent book (Hajjar 2005). Whether one 
agrees with Hajjar's analysis or not, and despite the significant legal and political 
changes that took place since her data collection (Benisho 2005), the legal system 
in the occupied territories is a forum where military members of one political 
entity try, convict and punish people of a different ethnicity, fighting for 
independence. This can hardly be compared to an internal military system which 
deals with Israeli soldiers. 
3. My access to the field was facilitated by the fact that my own military service, 
between 1996 and 2000, was performed in the military justice system; I was thus 
familiar with the different units, processes, and vernacular, and even maintained 
a few personal connections, though most of the junior personnel had changed. 
4. It IS probably due to these dIfferences between the two groups that they have not 
been previously discussed together in academia. Naturally, conscientious 
objection tends to draw much more scholarly attention, particularly in the fields 
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of legal doctrine and political philosophy. Notwithstanding the interesting 
features of the political and philosophical discussion of this problem, its intricate 
details and insights are largely irrelevant for the purpose of this study, though 
the fact that conscientious objection managed to raise considerable interest, while 
desertion failed to do so, is a finding in itself. 
5. The choice to select eighty-five cases of deserters stems from the fact that these 
verdicts tend to be very short and formatted (averaging two to three pages of 
text). as opposed to the conscientious objectors' verdicts, which were extremely 
lengthy and elaborate (seventy to one hundred pages). As I discuss above, the 
different prosecutorial decision-making processes. and the ideas that shape them. 
make for many desertion indictments and very few conscientious objection 
indictments; this, as explained above, is a finding rather than a methodological 
problem. However, I felt that a textual comparison would be more complete if 
similar amounts of text were analyzed for both problems, and therefore chose a 
number of deserter cases that was methodologically manageable and yielded 
about the same amount of text. Since patterns tended to repeat themselves, and 
emerged from careful reading, I did not engage in rigorous counting of textual 
expressions. 
6. In at least 50% of the cases, indictment followed an arrest by the military police; 
naturally, in these cases, the "length of absence" was defined by the arbitrary 
date of apprehension and therefore could not really indicate much about the 
severity of the deserter's act. 
7. The models can be easily mapped onto Packer's models of crime control and due 
process oriented systems (Packer 1968). However, rather than reflecting two 
different systems, they appear side by side in the same system, for handling 
offenses which violate the same values. 
8. This would not necessarily entail vocal support of the occupation in the territories: 
the message is subtler and has more to do with presenting the army as an 
apolitical body who follows legal, and ethically sound. governmental orders. 
9. The original meaning of the categories in Rawlsian theory is substantially modi-
fied in their translation to "legalspeak"; not only are the categories redefined, 
but they are made to be mutually exclusive, to allow for classification, a feature their 
original meanings did not possess (Rawls 1999). 
10. Absences ranged between I and 2,690 days, with a mean of 131 and a median of 
71. Standard deviation was 227.9. The pattern indicates a large number of 
relatively short offenses, and a small percentage of long offenses, sometimes two 
years or more. For all observations, linear regression yielded an R square of 0.18, 
compared to 0.28 in logarithmic regression; for absences of a year or less, R 
square was 0.28 for linear regression and 0.23 for logarithmic regression. 
II. Since missing observations appeared in different categories for each case, I opted 
to fill the blanks with the variable mean rather than excluding all cases with a 
missing value from the model, which would lead to a very small number of 
observations. This was a possible course of action because there was no reason 
to assume that the observations with missing values differed from others 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld 1991). 
12. Two variables that appeared as significant in the original stepwise model were 
removed from this model: economic difficulties (R square = 0.137, b = 6.4) and 
escaping confinement (R square = -12.4, b = -8.3). The coefficient sign suggested 
that defendants whose economic difficulties were mentioned in the verdict got 
harsher punishment. This seemed to be rather illogical (even through a radical 
perspective!). and this result is therefore attributed to possible multicolinearity 
between this variable and the plea-bargain variable: naturally, for people who 
bargained for a set punishment, less data were included in the verdict, including 
data about economic situation. 
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In addition, the model suggested that defendants who escaped confinemen~ got 
harsher punishments than those who did not; this also co~ld n~t be ~xplallled, 
except perhaps by referring to the small number of cases III whIch thIS was the 
case and was therefore also excluded from the model. 
13. One'interesting ramification of this phenomenon is the creation of see,?i~gly 
wrong incentives for offenders. Repeated desertions, as well as drug conVIctIOns 
and other types of troublemaking, are grounds for discharge. It follows, therefore, 
that a recidivist deserter is twice rewarded for repeated offending: firstly, by 
managing to exit the army and secondly, by receiving a lenient imprisonment 
sentence. This inverted economic rationale suggests, again, that the court's 
commitment to values of deterrence and retribution is mostly rhetorical. 
14. The defendant's Jewishness was a mitigating factor, which was a discouraging 
finding; the bivariate table. however, reveals that it had a very small, albeit 
statistically significant, impact on the model as a whole. 
15. Cases tried before three judges yield harsher punishments than cases tried before 
a single judge, because military law limits the single judge's sentencing authority 
to one year. When the prosecution wishes to ask for a longer sentence, it asks for 
the case to be tried before three judges. The fact that these cases eventually do 
yield harsher punishments means that either the prosecution predicts well which 
cases are more severe, or the judges act by a self-fulfilled prophecy and treat the 
cases assigned to three judges as more severe. The latter assumption is attractive 
if one considers the fact that sometimes ten or fifteen cases will be heard on the 
same day, only one or two of them deemed "severe" by the prosecution, and still, 
the increased punishment for all cases was found to be significant. As to the 
finding that deserters represented by reserve service attorneys fare significantly 
worse than those represented by regular service attorneys or private attorneys, 
this can be attributed to the division of labor within the military defense, by 
which regular service attorneys prefer to take the more appealing cases and 
assign the less promising ones to reserve attorneys. 
16. This assumption is very difficult to test, as different objectors may view their 
objectives differently. The media coverage of the objection movement was 
certainly more favorable, and less criminalizing, than that of desertion, but it is 
impossible to establish whether this influenced the court's image of objectors or 
resulted from it (Aviram 2004). 
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